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Abstract
Our knowledge of real world is partial by our finite ability of the observation.
But, from such a partial knowledge, we not only infer the fact which we can make
sure but the fact which we cannot. It means that our inference is not closed in the
world which we can observe. To formalize such inference, MWL (Multi-world
logic) is proposed in this paper. Each formula ofMWL takes a closed set as truth
value, accordingly, MWL can express vagueness ofKnowledge.
l.lntroduction
Partial world
Since our finite ability of the observation, we do not have guarantee to observe
every part of real world. Thus, if our knowledge is the fact of real world, then our
knowledge is correct within our observation of real world. Consequently, we are
not able to mention about total real world, since there are unknown parts of real
world for us yet. Let call the part of real world where we can observe as partial
world.
Let consider the statement “bird can fly”. It is necessary to see this statement
as a correct fact of real world that we have already observed all ofbirds existed in
real world flied. But, we can not do it. Accordingly, the statement “bird can fly”is
the fact only within the partial world. Our knowledge is such a thing ? Of course,
not. Because, ifwe recognize the statement“bird can fly” as the knowledge of real
world, then we apply it to the bird which we did not observe yet, and we infer that
it can fly.
It means that our knowledge is not the description of the fact occurred in real
world, but it is the description of the explanation of real world which is the fact in
the partial world.
In this paper,the knowledge of real world is recognized as the explanation of real






MWL aims at the theory explains our inference that can infer facts in real-
world from facts in the partial world of the real world. MWL supposes that, for the
concerning of the inference facts on the total state from the facts in the partial
state, the truth values and inference have properties as follow:
O There are two kinds of truth value. One is reflected of our observation of
partial world. ,and the other is reflected ofour guess about real world.
O We formalize both truth value as set ,and give the relation between them as
the truth value reflected our guess is closure of the truth value reflected our
observation.
2.$Truth$ value sPace
Let $(P,\leqq)$ be a partiality ordered set, and we call element $p$ of $P$ as path.
Mapping $f:Xarrow Y$ is a continuous mapping if and only if $f$ satisfies conditions as
following:
$O1f(a\in X)=a\in Y$ ,
Ofor any $A\subset X,$ $f(CL_{X}(A))\subseteq CL_{Y}(f(A))$ ,
We denote that there is a continuous mapping from topological space$(X,CLx)$
to (Y,CLy) as topological space $(X,CL_{X})$ is contained by $(Y,CL_{Y})$ , and express as
$(X,CL_{X})\subseteq(Y,CL_{Y})$ .
Definition:Truth value space
Let Xp be a set of the topological spaces indexed by P. Let $(X_{p},CL_{p})$ be a
topological space which is an element ofXp called truth value space of path $p$ . We
suppose that Xp satisfies the condition as
for any p,q $ofP,$ $ifp\leqq q$ ,then $(X_{p}, CL_{p})\subseteq(X_{q}, CL_{q})$ .
3.Formal lanquaqe $L$
Let us define the formal language $L$ ofMWL. Let $C_{v}$ and $C_{c}$ be two enumerable
sets of symbols called a variable and an individual constant (or constant). First
we define a term ofMWL, according to the following rules:
O Every variables and constants are terms,
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O If ‘1, { $t_{n}^{}$ are vaffable symbols or constant symbols; $\cdot$ then $(t_{1},\ldots,t_{n})$ is a
term,
O Only those defined by a finite number of applications of the above rules are
terms.
The variabIe which is not bounded any quantifier $\forall,$ $\exists$ is calIed a free variable ,
and which is bounded is called a bounded variable. Let Cr be enumerable sets of
symbols called a predicate symbol. Next we define the formula ofMWL , according
to the following rules:
Definition (formula)
$O1$ If $t_{1},\ldots,t_{n}$ are variables or constants and $a$ is a n-variables predicate symbol,
where $n\geqq 0,thena(t_{1},\ldots,t_{n})$ is a formula,
O2 If $a,$ $ai$ , .where $i\in$ I,and $\beta$ are formulas, then $\neg a,$ $aarrow’\beta,$ $\bigwedge_{i\in 1}\mathfrak{a}_{i}$ $\vee i\in Ia_{i}$ ,
$\square a,and\langle\rangle a$ are formulas,
O If $a(t)$ is a formula and $x$ is a bounded variable which not occurs within $a(t)$ ,
then $\forall xa1x$) and $\exists xa(x)$ are formulas,
O Only those defined by a finite number of applications of the above rules are
formulas.
The term which has no free variable is called closed term. And the formula which
has no free variable is called sentence (or closed formula).
Multi-world model
Multi-world model $M$ is a triple $<P,d,V’,V>.P$ is a set of paths. $d$ is a function
assigning individual domain to each path $ofP.V’$ is a set ofthe function $V_{p}$ which
assigns the truth value reflected of observation to each atomic symbols. And, V is
the set of the function $V_{P}$ which assigns the truth value reflected of guess to each
sentence. We discuss their in following sections.
Assiqnment function
Let X and $Y$ be two sets, we denote a set of all the functions from X to $Y$ as
$(Xarrow Y)$ . If $f$ is an element of $(Aarrow B)$, then the function $f|_{A’}$ , called restriction of $f$
within $A’$ , is defined as
$Q_{A’}:A’arrow B$ ,
$f|_{A’(}x)=f(x)-ifx\in A\cap A’$ ,
’
$Q_{A’}(x)=\perp-ifx\in A’$ -A.




Let $V_{p}’$ be a partial function assigning some individual and truth value
respectively to term and predicate synbol of L. $V_{p}’$ is defined according to the
following rules:
OIft is a variable or constant, then $V_{p}’(t)\in D_{p}$,
@$IfR$ is a n-variable predicate symbol, then $V_{P}’(R)\in 1D_{p^{n}}arrow 2^{x}))|D_{p^{n}}$ .
Let $d$ be a function assigning a nonempty set d(p)to each path $p$ of P. We denote
d(p)as $D_{p}$, and call Dp as scope of path $p$ . We suppose that there is the relation
between paths $ofP$ as
for any p,q $ofP$, if $p\leqq q,thenD_{p}\subseteq D_{q}$ .
$\frac{PropertiesofV’}{Wedenotethed}E_{o^{-}main}$
of $g$ as dom(g). The partial $order\subseteq between$ function $f$ and
$g$ is defined as
for any $x$ ofdom(g), $ifg(x)\subseteq f(x)$ , then $g\subseteq f$ .
Now we assume that $V_{p}’$ satisfies the condition as
for any path $p$ and $qofP,$ $ifp\leqq q$ , then V $P\subseteq V_{q}’$
Now we define $V_{p}$ which is a partial function assigning some truth value in
extended world to each term and predicate symbol of L. First we define the
assignment ofclosed term as following rules:
OIf $t$ is a con$s$tant, then $V_{p}1t$) $=V_{p}’(t)$ ,
OIf $t$ is a closed term $(t_{1},\ldots,t_{n})$ , then $V_{p}(t)=<V_{p}(t_{1}),\ldots,V_{p}(t_{n})>\in D_{p^{n}}$,
Let $C_{p}$ be a smallest family which includes all the closed sets of $X_{p}$ . Note we define
$X_{p}$ as the union ofall truth values given to formula by $V_{p}’$ . We define the relation
$R$ of the path $p$ as
RE $(D_{p^{n}}arrow C_{p})|_{D_{p}^{n}}$ .
The relation $R$ is the function assigning a closed set of $C_{P}$ to each closed terms.
We define the function $V_{p}$ according to the following rules:
OIf $a$ is a n-variables predicate symbol $\beta$, then
$V_{p}(a)\in(D_{p^{n}}arrow C_{p})|_{D_{p}^{n}}$ ,
OIf $a$ is $\beta(t)$ , then
$V_{P}(a1=V_{P}(\beta)(V_{p}1t))$ ,




OIf $a$ is A $i\in 1\beta_{i},then$
$V_{p}(\mathfrak{a})=\bigcap_{i\in 1}V_{p}(\beta_{i})$ ,
OIf $a$ is V $i\in 1\beta i,then$
$V_{p}(a)=CL_{p}(\bigcup_{i\in 1}V_{p}(\beta_{i}))$ ,
OIf $a$ is $\langle>\beta$ , then
$V_{p}(a)=CL_{q}(u_{pq}\leqq V_{q}(\beta))$ ,
OIf $a$ is $\square \beta$ , then
$V_{p}(a)=\bigcap_{p\leqq q}V_{q}(\beta)$ ,
OIf $a$ is $\betaarrow\gamma$ , then
$V_{p}(a)=CL_{p}((X_{p}-V_{p}(\beta))\cup V_{p}(\gamma))$ ,
OIf $a$ is $\forall x\beta(x)$ , where $\beta$ is the n-variable predicate , then
$V_{p}(a)=\cap V_{p}(x)\in D_{p^{n}}V_{p}(\beta(a))$ ,
OIf $a$ is $\exists x\beta(x)$ , where $\beta$ is the n-variable predicate , then
$V_{p}(\mathfrak{a})=CL_{p}(\cup V_{P}(x)\in D_{p^{n}}V_{p}(\beta(a)))$
Let us assume that $V_{P}’$ and $V_{P}$ satisfy the following:
for any $a\in C_{r},$ $V_{p}(a(t))=CL_{p}(V_{p}’1\mathfrak{a}1t)))$ .
True and False
“
$MF_{p}a(M\exists_{P}a)$ , where $a$ is a formula, $M$ is a model of MWL, and $p$ is a path of
the model $M$, is used to express that the formula $a$ is true(false )at the path $p$ of
the model M. We define $MF_{p}a(M\exists_{P}a)as$ the following;
$Mk_{p}$ $a$ iff $V_{p}(\mathfrak{a})=X_{p}$ at the path $p$ of the model $M$,
$M\exists_{P}$ $a$ iff $V_{P}(a)=\phi$ at the path $p$ of the model M.
” MF$a(M\exists a)$ is used to express that $a$ is true(false) at any path of model $M$,
furthermore, “ $Fa(\exists \mathfrak{a})$ is used to express that $a$ is true(false) at any path of any
model. In particular, if the formula $a$ holds $Fa(\exists a)$ , then we call $a$ as axiom
(contradiction) ofMWL.
Proposition
Let $M$ be a model ofMWL, $p$ a path of $M$, and $a$ a formula ofL.
It is not the case that $a$ hold both $MF_{P}=$ $a$ and M# $p^{a}$ .





In MWL, according to Definition ofnegation $ofV_{p}$,
for any fornula $\mathfrak{a}$, if $\exists a(Fa),then\Leftarrow\neg a(\exists\neg a)$
is held, but
for any formula $a$ , ifnot $Fa(\exists a),thenF\neg a(\exists\neg a)$
is not held. Since the truth value of formula is a closed set, thus
for any formula $a,$ $Fa$ or $\exists a$
is not held. Accordingly,
for any formula $a$ , ifnot $Fa(\exists a),then\exists a(Fa)$
is not held.
3. lnference
We now consider inference rules ofMWLby Gentzen‘s fornalization.
Definition:sequent
Let consider the formula which is provable logically. When $A_{1},\ldots,A_{n},B_{1},\ldots,B_{m}$
are formulas, where n,m $\geqq 0,then$ we say the expression of the form
$A_{1},\ldots,A_{n}\Rightarrow B_{1},\ldots,B_{m}$
is sequent. The sequent $A_{1},\ldots,A_{n}\Rightarrow B_{1},\ldots,B_{m}$ has the same interpretation as the
formula $A_{1}\wedge\ldots\wedge A_{n}arrow B_{1\vee\cdots\vee}B_{m}$ . When the part of succedent (the part of
$B_{1},\ldots,B_{m})$ is empty sequence as
$A_{1},\ldots,A_{n}\Rightarrow$
, then we say that contradiction is occurred from $A_{1},\ldots,A_{n}$ . And when the part of
antecedent (the part $ofA_{1},\ldots,A_{n}$ ) $is$ empty sequence as
$\Rightarrow B_{1},\ldots,B_{m}$
, then we $say$ any of $B_{1},\ldots,B_{m}$ is hold”. In particular, when the sequent is
$\Rightarrow$
,then we $s$ay that contradiction is occurred without any assumption. We defined




Furthermore, we define $V_{p}(\Gamma)$ and $V_{p}(\Delta)$ as $\cap A\in rV_{P}(A)$ and $CL_{p}(\bigcup_{B\in\Delta}V_{p}(B))$.
In particular, when $\Gamma$ and $\Delta$ are empty sequences, we define $V_{p}(\Gamma)$ and $V_{p}(\Delta)$ as
$X_{p}$ and $\Phi$ .
We define the sequent of MWL as the sequent which appears at most one
formula in the part of antecedent.
The truth value given to each formula by $V_{p}$ implies the truth value given by
V $p$ . It means that interpretation of the formula in MWL may be vague against
real world. On the other hand, the part of antecedent expresses assumption of the
sequent , thus to appear several fornulas in the part of antecedent effects as
increasing vagueness of assumption. This is the reason why in MWL the sequent
is restricted as before. For example,the sequent $\neg a\wedge a$ is not always false in MWL
lnference rutes of MWL
Now we consider the inference rules ofMWL. Let $a,$ $p$ be formulas, and $\Delta,$ $\Delta_{i}(i$
$\in I),$ $\Pi$ are sequences of zero or more formulas. In particular, let $\Gamma$ be a sequence of
at most one formula. We say formula $a,$ $\beta$ appears in the upper sequent of
inference rules as sub-formula. And we say formulas which contain sub-formula
$a,$ $p$ and appears in the lower sequent of inference rules as chief-formula. The
whole difference between MWL $s$ inference rules and LK (classical predicate
$logic)’s$ inference rules is that there is at most one formula in the part of ancident
of sequent in MWL’s inference rules. Now inference rules of MWL show as the
following:
$w\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow\Delta$ $\Rightarrow w$
$\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$
$a\Rightarrow\Delta$ . $\Gamma\Rightarrow \mathfrak{a},$ $\Delta$ .
$e\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow e$ $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $a$. $\beta,$ $\Pi$




syllogism $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta i.a$ $ti\in I$ ) $a\Rightarrow\Pi$
$\Gamma\Rightarrow\ldots,\Delta i,\ldots,\Pi$ .
$\neg\Rightarrow$ $\underline{\Rightarrow\Delta}\underline{a}$ $\Rightarrow\neg$ $\underline{a\Rightarrow\Delta}$
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$v\Rightarrow$ $a\underline{i}\Rightarrow\Delta 1i\in I1$ $\Rightarrow\vee$ $arrow\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta a$




$arrow\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $a$ $\beta\Rightarrow\Lambda$ $\Rightarrowarrow$ $a\Rightarrow\Delta_{*}\beta$
$aarrow\beta\Rightarrow\Delta$ , A. $\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $aarrow\beta$.
$\forall\Rightarrow$ $a(t)\Rightarrow\Delta$ $\Rightarrow\forall$ $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ . $ata$)
$\forall xa(x)\Rightarrow\Delta$ , $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $\forall x\mathfrak{a}(x)$ ,
where $t$ is where the free variable a does not occur
an arbitrary term. in the lower sequent.
$\exists\Rightarrow$ $a(a)\Rightarrow\Delta$ $\Rightarrow\exists$ $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta_{*}$ ct(t)
$\exists xa(x)\Rightarrow\Delta$ , $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $\exists xa(x)$ ,
where the free variable a where $t$ is
does not occurring the lower sequent. an arbitrary term.
$\square \Rightarrow$ $a\Rightarrow\Delta$ $\Rightarrow\square$ $\square \Gamma\Rightarrow a$
$\square a\Rightarrow\Delta$ . $\square \Gamma\Rightarrow\square a$.
$O\Rightarrow$ $a\Rightarrow\langle\rangle\Delta$ $\Rightarrow O$ $\underline{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta a}$
$Oa\Rightarrow\langle\rangle\Delta$. $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $\theta a$.
Theorem:Normal form theorem of MWL





The whole difference between MWL’s inference rules and $LK’s$ inference rules
is that there is at most one formula in the part of ancident of sequent in MWL’s
inference rules. Hence the proof of nornal form theorem of MWL is the proof of
normal form theorem of LK under the restriction on the sequent in the proof,





MWL is consistent , if and only if the $sequent\Rightarrow is$ not provable in MWL. By
normal form theorem ofMWL, if the $sequent\Rightarrow is$ provable in MWL, then there is
a proofof the $sequent\Rightarrow without$ using syllogism. The inference rule whose lower
sequent does not contains the chief-formula is only syllogi$sm$. Thus, there is no
proof of the $sequent\Rightarrow without$ using syllogism. Consequently, the $sequent\Rightarrow is$
not provable in MWL.
Theorem:Soundness of MWL
If the sequent $S$ is provable,then $FS$ .
(Proof)omit
Theorem
Let $a$ and $\beta$ be an arbitrary formula ofMWL.
$O1\neg a\wedge a\Rightarrow is$not provable in MWL,
@=) $\neg a\vee a$ is provable in MWL,
$O\neg\neg \mathfrak{a}\Rightarrow a$ is provable in MWL,
$O4a\Rightarrow\neg\neg a$ is not provable in MWL,
$O5a\wedge\beta\Rightarrow a(or\beta\wedge a\Rightarrow a)$ is provable in MWL,
@a\Rightarrow a\vee \beta (or $a\Rightarrow\beta\vee a$) is provable in MWL,
$O\neg a^{\neg}\beta\Leftrightarrow\neg(a\wedge\beta)$ is provable in MWL,
$Oaarrow\beta\Rightarrow\neg a\vee\beta$ is provable in MWL,
$O\neg a\vee\beta\Rightarrow aarrow\beta$ is not provable in MWL,
@a\Rightarrow \beta \rightarrow a is not provable in MWL,
Let $a$ be an arbitrary formula, and $t$ a arbitrary term.
$O1\forall xa(x)\Rightarrow\exists xa(x)$ is provable in MWL,
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@ $\forall x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\neg\exists xa(x)$ is not provable in MWL,
$O$ ’ $\neg\exists xa(x)\Rightarrow\forall x\neg a(x)$ is provable in MWL,
$O4$ ’ $\neg\forall xa(x)\Rightarrow\exists x\neg a(x)$ is provable in MWL,
$O5\exists x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\neg$ Vx $a(x)$ is provable in MWL,
$O$ ’ $\neg\forall x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\exists xa(x)$ is provable in MWL,
$O$ ” $\exists xa(x)\Rightarrow\neg\forall x\neg a(x)$ is not provable in MWL,
$O$ ’ $\neg\exists x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\forall xa(x)$ is provable in MWL,
$O$ ” $\forall xa(x)\Rightarrow\neg\exists x\neg a(x)$ is not provable in MWL,
$O$ ’ $\forall xa(x)\Rightarrow a(t)$ is provable in MWL,
$O$ ” $a(t)\Rightarrow\exists xa(x)$ is provable in MWL,
(Proof)
We consider proofs ofseveral theorem.
OLet suppose that the sequent $\neg a\Lambda a\Rightarrow is$ provable in MWL. Let $P$ be the proof
of $\neg a\wedge a\Rightarrow with$out using syllogism and let I be the last inference rule ofP. Since




$\frac{\neg a\Rightarrow}{\neg a\wedge a\Rightarrow}$
$O$
$\frac{a\Rightarrow}{\neg a\wedge a\Rightarrow}$
CaseO:If I is Ol, then the $sequent\Rightarrow is$ provable. Thus, this case conflicts with
consistency ofMWL.
CaseO, $O:The$ upper sequent of the inference rule, of which lower sequent is
$\neg a\Rightarrow,iseither\Rightarrow or\Rightarrow a$ . On the other hand, at least any sequent ofMWL satisfies
that the logical symbol occurs in it or antecedent and succedent are not empty
sequence of formula. Axiom $a\Rightarrow a$ satisfies this condition. For any inference rule
except syllogism, if the upper sequent satisfies this condition, then the lower
sequent satisfies. Thus, any provable sequent of MWL satisfies this condition.
Thus, the $sequent\Rightarrow a$ and $a\Rightarrow are$ not provable in MWL. Consequently, $\neg a\wedge a\Rightarrow$
is not provable in MWL.
$O1\forall x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\neg\exists xa(x)$ is not provable in MWL.
Suppose that the sequent $\forall x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\neg\exists xa(x)$ is provable in MWL ,and we
denote its proofwithout using syllogism as P.
(A) The formula $\neg\exists xa(x)$ does not appear in the antecedent of any sequent of P.
Thus, the succedent of the initial sequent is not $\neg\exists xa(x)$ , since initial sequent is
the expression of the form $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Gamma$ . Thus, there is a inference rule $I_{1}$ of which the
succedent of the upper sequent is not $\neg\exists xa(x)$ , and the succedent of the lower
sequent is $\neg\exists xa(x)$ . Such inference rule $I_{1}is\Rightarrow\neg or\Rightarrow w$ .
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(B) If Ii $is\Rightarrow\neg an\phi,the$ antecedent of the upper sequent, of Il is $\exists xa(x)$ , then
there is ainference rule $I_{2}$ of which the succedent of the upper sequent is not $\exists x$
$a(x)$ , and the succedent of the lower sequent contains $\exists xa(x)$ . Such inference rule
$I_{2}$ is $\exists\Rightarrow orw\Rightarrow$ .
(C) If $I_{2}$ is $\exists\Rightarrow$ ,then the antecedent of the upper sequent of $\ddagger_{2}$ contains $a(a).\dot{T}$hus,
there is a inference} $rule$ I3 ofwhich the antecedent of‘the low\"er sequent contains
the formula $a(a)$ . Such inference rule I3 is $w\Rightarrow$ . $r_{D}$
(D) If the initial sequent is $a(a)\Rightarrow a(a)$ , then there isa $inferenceruIeI_{4}’\wedge$ of which
the antecedent of the lower sequent is not $a(a)$ , and the antecedent of the upper
sequent is $a(a)$ . Such inference rule I4 is $\exists\Rightarrow$ and I4 appears upper than $I_{2}$ . Thus,
the antecedent of the lower sequent of14 contains the formula $a(a)$ . But, it does not
satisfies the condition that the lower sequent of $\exists\Rightarrow does$ not contain free variable
$a$ .
(E) If $I_{1},Iz,andI_{3}$ are the weaken rule (i.e. $w\Rightarrow or\Rightarrow w$ ), then,since the sequent $\forall x$
$\neg a(x)$ is provable, it conflicts. Consequently, the sequent $\forall x\neg a(x)\Rightarrow\neg\exists xa(x)$ is
not provable in MWL.-
Conclusion
We discuss our inference that can infer facts which consist in total world from
facts which consist in partial world, and, in this paper, we formalize it as the
inference ofMWL.
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